During the latest financial crisis, authorities worldwide provided substantial financial support to some problem banks while, at the same time, let several others to go bankrupt that also incurred massive losses on the system. The recapitalization of troubled institutions combined with the cost of failed banks and the large stimulus programmes that governments introduced to revive demand led to the explosion of public debt in several advanced economies. In this paper, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the factors related to the operation of the banking system that led to the recent crisis through the development of an early warning model of bank distress applying a dynamic methodology that has not been used before in the bank failure literature. Special attention is paid on the relevance of modern activites that produce non-interest income in the probability of bank failure. We provide evidence that banking firms with illiquid and risky assets, inadequate equity capital, poor management, and low level of earnings have high probability of failure. Most importantly, we show that large banks that rely more on modern products to finance their operations are less safe compared to those that focus on traditional services like deposit-taking and loan-granting.
Introduction
In September 2007, Northern Rock, one of the most significant retail banking institutions in UK and a substantial mortgage lender, after being largely affected by the problems in credit markets triggered by the US subprime crisis, sought for a liquidity support facility in order to replace money market funding. Due to the systemic importance of Northern Rock and in order to prevent the negative effects the bank's failure could have on the entire system, Bank of England took the decision to extend a loan facility to the distressed institution. By January 2008, Northern Rock had borrowed more than USD 25 billion from the Bank of England. A month later and after the weakness of Northern Rock to find a commercial buyer that would commit to repay taxpayers' money, the bank was eventually nationalised by the British Government that effectively took ownership away from its shareholders. Benelux countries in 2008. Apparently, the primary purpose of all these rescues was the sudden collapse of troubled institutions to be averted. But even more importantly, bank bailout policies were aiming at maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic risk in financial markets.
Nevertheless, as it is almost always the case, every coin has two sides. On 4 October 2007, Miami Valley Bank was hit by the credit crunch and shut down by the US federal 1 August 2007 is generally accepted as the start date of the recent financial crisis because this is when the TED spread (i.e., the difference between the value of short-term Eurodollar futures contracts and the interest paid on short-term US T-bills), which is an indicator of credit risk, widened to almost 200 basis points relative to a historically stable range of 10-50 basis points. According to the above discussion, the US federal authorities as well as the EU and other national authorities have provided substantial financial support to several banking organizations while, at the same time, have let many others to go bankrupt that also incurred massive losses on the system. From an economic point of view, the recapitalization of troubled institutions combined with the cost of failed banks and the large stimulus programmes that governments introduced to revive demand led to the explosion of public debt in several advanced economies. These fiscal problems are to a great extent responsible for the upsurge in sovereign risk, which has put a further upward pressure on countries' borrowing cost undermining the value of their currencies. In this context, some borrowed countries are now facing difficulties in repaying their loans or even obtaining new loans from the markets (see, e.g., Ireland and Greece).
Apparently, a banking crisis has serious financial and economic consequences. A well-functioning and robust banking sector, on the other hand, strengthens the stability of the entire financial system and is a crucial determinant of economic growth (see, e.g., 2 This number does not contain Lehmann Brothers that also declared bankruptcy in September 2008. The reason for this exclusion is twofold: first, Lehmann was an investment bank and as such it was neither supervised from, nor insured by FDIC; and, second, this has been the biggest bank failure in the history of US and is thus treated as an outlier in our study and is omitted from our data sample for reasons that we will discuss below. 3 A very small number of bank failures have also reported in Europe. These failures mainly concern Icelandic institutions as already mentioned. 4 In order to get a broader picture of the extent of bank failures in the recent crisis, we indicate that the total number of banks that went bankrupt in US from early 2000 to the beginning of the crisis in August 2007 was only 25 according to the "FDIC failed bank list". system for predicting banking failures has again come to the forefront due to the recent crisis. In this paper, we focus on US banking market with a twofold purpose. First, to contribute to the development of an early warning model that will timely detect the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the operation of the banking market. Such a model is expected to provide regulators with some of the necessary tools to accurately distinguish healthy from distressed institutions and to work as an effective mechanism for preventing future crises. Our second purpose is to estimate how bank failure is particularly associated with non-traditional banking activities. Over the past couple of decades or more, banks have been diversifying away from traditional financial intermediation services like deposit-taking and loan-granting into non-interest income business. The relaxation of regulation in the banking industry in the years before the crisis is credited as being one of the main factors that has inadvertently led banks to get involved with activities that generate non-interest (fee) income and are not necessarily reported on banks' balance sheets. The observed growth in this kind of activities has been widely recognised in the relevant literature as having a considerable impact on the risk-taking behaviour of banks (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Baele et al., 2007; De Jonghe, 2010) .
Overall, in this paper we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the factors related to the operation of the banking system that led to the recent financial crisis through the development of an early warning model of bank distress. At the same time, we expect to obtain valuable insights on how to better structure the components of the banking system with the utmost purpose to reduce bank actions that exert a negative impact on the stability of the financial system.
To our knowledge, this is the first work that applies the dynamic methodology of
Shumway (2001) to develop an early warning system of banking fragility. 5 Moreover, though several studies have investigated the role of modern activities in the risk-taking behaviour of individual banks, we are not aware of any study that explicitly examines the impact of non-traditional banking services on risk of failure using a dynamic approach. 5 Shumway's hazard model has been applied to the prediction of corporate bankruptcy in recent empirical studies (see, e.g., Campbell et al 2008; Nam et al 2008) .
Lastly, our sample of problem banks refers to the recent financial crisis distinguishing this paper from all other failure studies that focus on past crises.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the econometric methodology and describes the data set and the model variables that are employed in our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results, whereas Section 4 concludes.
Empirical analysis
Empirically, we first identify all US banking institutions that have either failed or were bailed out during the recent financial crisis, that is, from August 2007 onwards. Failed banks are defined as the insured banks that have been closed requiring disbursements by the FDIC. We collect the relevant information from the official website of FDIC. Table 1 presents the 329 problem institutions, of which 319 have failed and 10 have received financial assistance. 6 The names of the banks, the distribution of banks across US states and cities, the date that every failed institution ceased to exist as a privately held going concern, the estimated assets and deposits of each institution at the time of failure, and the cost of every individual failure for FDIC (where available) are all reported in Table 1 .
Together with the original sample, we also construct a control sample that consists of sound institutions, i.e., banks that have neither failed nor bailed out during the examined period.
Bank balance sheet data are hand-collected from FDIC Reports on Condition and Following the relevant literature (Cole and Gunther, 1995; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) the main explanatory variables of our model are based on the components of the CAMEL rating system. The idea is to construct a set of financial variables that will largely resemble the original CAMEL system, which is used by the US authorities to monitor banking conditions. 8 We thus use a set of several different measures of Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management expertise, Earnings strength, and Liquidity. In particular, the equity to assets ratio is used as an indicator of bank capital strength; asset quality is measured with loan loss provisions divided by total loans; the quality of bank management is proxied by total operating income as a fraction of total assets, which is a typical measure of operating efficiency in the banking literature (see, e.g., Lane et al., 1986) ; the return on assets is applied as a measure of earnings strength, whereas the ratio of liquid to total assets reflects the degree of bank liquidity. Modern banking activities are captured with the value of off-balance sheet items scaled by total assets as well as the ratio of non-interest income (which is produced by innovative financial assets) to total income. Besides the above variables, we control for bank size by incorporating the logarithm of total assets as well as variations in the macroeconomic conditions proxied by the GDP growth rate. All the variables we use are described in Table 2 , where summary statistics are presented in Table 3 .
Regression results
The regression results which are presented in Table 4 reveal that the more capital a bank holds as a buffer against potential financial turmoil, the less likely is to fail. Put differently, banks which are highly levered are more likely to go bankrupt or to need financial aid in case of distress. In a similar vein, more profitable banks as well as those that hold a larger proportion of liquid assets in their portfolios have lower failure likelihood. The same holds true for those institutions that have the ability to operate more efficiently. As expected, the failure probability increases with loan loss provisions. This last finding implies that low-quality loans and leases pose a threat to bank soundness.
Consequently, banks need to focus more on credit risk management, which has proved to be problematic the years before the recent crisis.
Interestingly, modern banking activities are associated with higher failure probability.
This implies that the banks which are concentrated on traditional activities like deposittaking and loan-granitng are healthier than those that are entangled with new financial instruments. 9 Evidently, the relationship that holds between the diversification of bank output through the production and release of modern financial items with risk could be either negative or positive. More specifically, there exist at least two channels through which product diversification leads to a reduction in the overall bank risk-taking and thus a decrease in the probability of failure. The first channel shows that non-interest income is less sensitive to changes in the economic and business environment than interest income, which is produced by traditional assets, like bank loans. As a consequence, banks which rely more on the former type of income are typically exposed to less risk as they manage to reduce the cyclical variations in profits and revenue. Turning to the second channel that hinges upon the traditional banking and portfolio theories (see, e.g., Diamond, 1984) , in case there is a negative or a weak correlation between the above two sorts of income, then any observed increase in the share of fee-generating activities in the overall portfolio of banking items reduces the volatility of total earnings via diversification effects. Hence, the failure likelihood is again reduced.
Nevertheless, each coin has two sides. In line with our empirical findings, DeYoung and Roland (2001) argue that non-interest income is less stable compared to its interest counterpart, implying that non-traditional activities increase bank riskiness. This is due to the following three reasons: the nature of bank-customer relationships, input mixes, and lower capital requirements for the fee-generating activities. To start with the former cause, traditional activities generate relatively stable relationships between banks and their customers impying that switching and information costs for both parties are rather high and hence it is not in the interest of either side to walk away. In contrast, the aforementioned costs are lower in the case of modern financial products making the demand for the latter lines of business far from solid and continuous. Overall, whereas 9 The banking literature provides ample empirical evidence on the upsurge in the volume of modern activities of US banking institutions all the years before the recent crisis (see, e.g., Rogers and Sinkey, 1999; Stiroh, 2004) .
interest income appears to be rather stable, non-interest income is likely to fluctuate over time and this has a negative impact on the probability of failure. Second, a bank can extend a lending relationship only with a burden on its variable cost (i.e., interest expense). However, if the bank takes the decision to increase the volume of nontraditional services offered to its customers, it will have to hire additional fixed labor inputs and this will lead to an increase in its operating leverage. A higher operating leverage, in turn, is expected to amplify revenue volatility into higher profit volatility.
That is, the involvement in non-traditional activities is again related to a higher risk of failure, which is in line with our results. Finally, the existing banking regulatory environment under both Basel I and II allows banks to hold just a small amount of capital against fee-based activities in comparison with the amount that they are forced to hold for traditional items and which is much higher. The differences in capital requirements suggest an enhanced financial leverage that is related with higher earnings volatility for non-traditional activities.
As regards bank size, it is positively linked to the dependent variable of our model, which indicates that larger institutions are more likely to go bankrupt. In fact, this finding is closely linked to the above discussion. Big banks are considered as being universal institutions in the sense that they are much more exposed to all kind of activites in contrast to small, community banks which are mainly focused on deposit-taking and loan-granting,. Indeed, literature (see, e.g., Rime and Stiroh, 2003) has showed that big banks are very prone to universal banking activities in contrast to small and mid-sized banks, which are less diversified and resemble single-line businesses.This is to say, large banks which are more involved in this sort of activities face a higher probability of failure than their smaller counterparts. However, this last result needs to be treated with caution, since very large banks are considered as "too-big-to-fail" in the sense that authorities rarely let large, systemically important banks to fail for the reasons that have been already discussed in the introductory part of the paper. This explains why all 10 nearfailed institutions in our sample are among the largest US banks and have been financially supported by the authorities.
Conclusion
The present study is based on the dynamic hazard model of Shumway (2001) There have been 59 savings associations (i.e., thrifts) that have either failed or received assistance by the US government during the recent crisis. These institutions are not considered in our analysis since they file different regulatory reports compared to that filed by commercial and savings banks. Effective date refers to the date that the failed/assisted institution ceased to exist as a privately held going concern. Source: FDIC website www.fdic.gov 
